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Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and

Overview

PHILIP N. HABLUTZEL* AND DAVID

I.

R. SELMER**

INTRODUCTION

The method, tactics and law of hostile corporate takeovers have
gone through a number of transformations over the past sixty-five
years. This article will outline that history and the interplay between
state and federal law. Two of the durable problems underlying this
development are how many of the legal ground rules should be
federal law and whether such federal law should be exclusive or
concurrent with a state law scheme. A third recurring theme is
whether the legal ground rules should be neutral in the contest
between acquirers and reluctant target firms. As soon as the United
States Supreme Court handed down its decision in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America,' inApril 1987, it became apparent that
there was an area for state regulation of takeovers which would be
constitutional. Since that date, many states have enacted legislation
to occupy that area and several such proposals are pending in the
Illinois General Assembly. In preparing oneself to assess such proposals, it is useful to see how this field of law has evolved. In
describing this history, several large fieldi of law and practice will
be summarized in a broad way, while a few of the particular statutory
schemes will be described in more detail.
II.

BEFORE THE WILLIAMS ACT: PROXY FIGHTS

Before the Williams Act 2 was passed, and indeed before the

Depression of the 1930's, the method of a hostile takeover was to
conduct a proxy fight. State corporation statutes allow shareholders
Professor of Law, IT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
David R. Selmer is a partner with the Chicago law firm of Barack,
Ferrazzano, Kirschbaum & Perlman. He would like to thank Joshua S. Kanter, an
associate with Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbaum & Perlman, for his assistance in
reviewing Sections VII-IX of this article.
1. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) & (e), 78n(d) - (f) (1986).
*
**
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to vote in person at shareholders' meetings or to vote by proxy.3
Proxies are agencies which are revocable unless "coupled with an
interest." ' 4 A minority group of insurgent shareholders would solicit
proxies from the general mass of shareholders. Proxy fights could
become expensive and highly publicized; some proxy contests were
legendary. 5 Because some were also perceived as dirty, Congress
passed the proxy regulation provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.6 Under rule-making authorization contained in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended ("1934 Act"), the
Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated regulations
known as the "proxy rules." 7 The rules apply to solicitation of
proxies in respect to securities registered under the 1934 Act. 8 Congress did not seek to abolish the use of proxy fights in a hostile
takeover situation, but rather to regulate those fights and make them
fair. However, by increasing the paperwork and legal fees necessary,
Congress also made them more expensive.
It was said during the 1950's that insurgents were not likely to
win such a fight unless dividends had not been paid for several
years. This is due to the fact that management had several advantages
in addition to shareholder inertia. The corporate treasury would pay
the proxy fight expenses of incumbent management if they won, and
maybe also if they lost. 9 In marked contrast, insurgent shareholders
who lost a proxy contest paid their own expenses. Also, management
could usually rely on the votes from shares held by trustees of
pension plans, trusts, and similar entities. Bank trust officers and
3. HENN &

ALEXANDER,

LAW OF CORPORATIONS

§

196, at 518 (3d ed. 1983).

4. Id. at 520.
5. Id. at 523 n.37. The New York Central Railroad proxy fight of 1954 cost
management some $550,000 and $1.3 million was spent by insurgent shareholders.
The Montgomery Ward & Co. proxy contest of 1955 involved $700,000 on the part
of management and $500,000 by insurgents. A more recent proxy contest ending in
1978, between the Curtiss-Wright Corp. and the Kennecott Copper Corp., cost
Kennecott between $2.4 and $4.2 million. Id.
6. Acquiring control through a proxy contest requires compliance with §§ 14(a)(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a)-(e), and the rules
promulgated thereunder.
7. SEC Regulations 14A through 14D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14 to 240.14d (1984).
8. Applicable to companies with a class of equity securities registered under
§ 12(g) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C § 78e(g). Section 12 applies to issuers engaged in
or affecting interstate commerce whose securities are either listed on a national
securities exchange or are held of record by at least 500 persons if the issuer has total
assets exceeding $3 million.
9. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d
291 (1955).
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other trustees regularly voted for incumbent management, due, in
part, to the belief that such votes could be defended as the safe and
prudent thing to do and not a breach of the fiduciary duties of the
trustees to the beneficiaries.
By the 1960's, corporate raiders had learned how to avoid the
expense and risk of federal regulation under the proxy rules.10 Instead
of soliciting the vote of existing shareholders, one would solicit to
buy their stock." The tender offer was born and its use expanded
rapidly. The tender offer could be of two major types. In the
exchange offer (or "paper offer" or "stock swap offer"), the
acquirer would issue new securities to be given to the target firm's
shareholders. This new issue would normally need to be registered
under the Securities Act of 193312 ("1933 Act") and the necessary
prospectus would require detailed disclosures.'" Thus, exchange offers involved regulatory risk and the legal expenses necessary to
minimize that risk. In comparison, cash tender offers did not involve
the issuance of securities, nor the solicitation of proxies, and thus
were outside the federal regulatory schemes.' 4 Once this unregulated
"gap" between the securities issue regulations of the 1933
Act and
the proxy rules of the 1934 Act was discovered in the early 1960's,
the use of cash tender offers expanded dramatically." The Williams
10. Proxy fights involved two kinds of risks. First, the regulatory risk that one
might violate the proxy rules. Second, the economic risk that one would incur the
expenses, lose the proxy contest, and have nothing to show for the expenditure.
However, under a stock purchase, if one's purchase plan failed to achieve the ultimate
takeover, one might still have the value of the stock.
11. This circumvented the two major situations which normally triggered the
formal disclosure requirements of the federal regulations. This was not (1) the issuance
of securities to the target shareholders, nor (2) the solicitation of proxies from target
shareholders.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77kk (1986).
13. An exchange offer is made when a corporation makes an offer to shareholders of a target corporation to exchange shares of the offering corporation for
the individual's shares. Such an offer mandates compliance with certain registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1986).
14. See 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967). "The need for such legislation has been
caused by the increased use of cash tender offers rather than the regular proxy fight
to gain control of publicly owned corporations... [tihis legislation will close a
significant gap in investor protection under the federal securities laws . . . ." Id.
(remarks of Senator Williams).
15. The factor described as most directly responsible for the increase in the
number of cash tender offers was the presence of rigid pre-acquisition filing requirements affixed to the traditional takeover or merger, when accomplished through a
proxy contest or an exchange offer, and the absence of any regulation in the case of
the cash tender offer. See Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in
Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 499, 501 (1967).
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Bill' 6 was introduced to bring cash tender offers under SEC jurisdiction.
III.

THE WILLIAMS ACT

Congress extended the coverage of the securities laws to tender
7
offers by enacting the Williams Act in 1968.1 The Williams Act
8
amends Sections 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act" and applies to tender
offers for shares of publicly-held corporations registered under Section 13 of the 1934 Act.' 9 During the almost-twenty years since the
Williams Act was enacted, a vast body of law has developed on
tender offers. Rules and regulations under the 1934 Act, SEC releases
and numerous court decisions have created a legal specialty which
cannot be reproduced here. 20 However, the general regulatory scheme
of the Williams Act can be described.
The core of the Williams Act is a set of new subsections added
to the 1934 Act. New subsections 13(d) and 13(e) were added to the
reporting requirements of Section 13.21 New sub-sections 14(d), 14(e)
and 14(f) were added to the proxy provisions of Section 14.22 In
16. S.510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968).
17. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964), current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) & (e), 78n(d) - (f)
(1986).
18. See infra notes 21 & 22.
19. The Williams Act was made expressly applicable to companies with a class
of equity securities under § 12 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. of 78e(g). Subsequently,
the SEC promulgated Regulation 14E, which is applicable to all tender offers, 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-l to 240.14e-3, 240.14f-1 (1984).
20. For a good overview, see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcuRiTrEs REGULATION 497-541 (2d ed. 1988); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 658-712 (6th ed. 1987); T. HAZEN, TIE LAW OF SECURITES
REGULATION 336-385 (student ed. 1985).

21. The two new sections added by the Williams Act to § 13 of the 1934 Act
are § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1986) (requiring any person attaining beneficial
ownership of 5% of a class of registered equity securities to file within 10 days
specified information with the issuing corporation, the SEC, and every exchange
where the security is traded); and § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1986) (affording the
SEC power to regulate corporate stock purchases).
22. The three sections added by the Williams Act to § 14 of the 1934 Act are
§ 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1986) (governing pre-acquisition disclosure where tender

offer would result in offeror's owning more than 5% of a class of equity securities,
withdrawal rights of offeree, proration of offers for less than all of the target's
shares, and increased prices to be paid for shares tendered early); § 14(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (1986) (prohibiting fraud in the making of any tender offer); and § 14(0, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1986) (requiring disclosure where a change in the majority of the
Board of Directors would occur subsequent to the tender offer).
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addition, the SEC has added numerous rules for each of these new
23
subsections.
Essentially, the Williams Act requires that any person who

makes a tender offer for a class of securities which, if successful,

would make such person a beneficial owner of more than 5 percent

of that class of securities must first file a statement with the Securities

and Exchange Commission, and give a copy simultaneously to the
target firm. 24 Such statements must contain the information required
under Section 13(d)(1), 25 and include, among other things, the identity and background of the acquirer, 26 the source of funds for the

purchase,27 the offeror's current ownership of shares in the target

company, 2 and the plans for the target firm if acquired. 29 Solicita-

tions or recommendations to the target's shareholders are regulated
30

by the SEC.
In seeking to insure shareholder protection, the Williams Act
was carefully tailored to avoid any favoritism to either the tender

offeror or the management of the target company. 3' The regulations
.23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(l) authorize the SEC to enact rules and
regulations necessary to supplement the provisions of the Williams Act.
24. The 1934 Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1986). Section 14(d)(l)
provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make a tender offer for, or a
request or invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security . . . if,
after consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be
the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class, unless at the
time copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent
or given to security holders [and] such person has filed with the Commission
a statement containing such of the information [as is] specified in section
78m(d) of this title ....

Id.

25. The 1934 Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1986).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A).
27. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(B).
28. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(D).
29. Id. § 78m(d)(l)(C).
30. Section 14(d)(4) of the Williams Act requires that any solicitation or
recommendation to target shareholders to accept or reject or tender offer must
comply with SEC rules and regulations, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1986).
31. The Senate Committee stated:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of
regulation in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the
benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
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not only govern disclosure by an offeror, but also require that
management of a target company be subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. Within ten days of the beginning
of the offer, target management must publish or give to its shareholders a statement of its position: recommending acceptance or
rejection, or stating that management is neutral, or that it cannot
take any position.3 2 Consequently, the federal scheme affords shareholders an opportunity to make an informed decision based on the
positions advanced by both the tender offeror and the management
of the target company.
The Williams Act also provides tendering shareholders a number
of important substantive protections. The object of these provisions
is to protect a target company's shareholders by alleviating some of
the pressure inherent in determining when and whether to tender
their shares. These provisions require that the offeror keep the offer
open for at least twenty business days and for ten business days
after any change in the percentage of securities being sought, in the
33
price being offered, or in the dealer's solicitation fees. Tendering
shareholders are permitted to withdraw their tendered stock during
the first seven days of the offer, or after sixty days if the offeror
has not already purchased the tendered shares.3 4 In addition, if the
acquirer is successful, then in case of an overacceptance by the
target's shareholders, the acquirer must accept tendered stock on a
35
pro rata basis, rather than a first-come-first-bought basis. Finally,
when some shareholders tender their stock at an initial price and the
all tendering shareholders must
offering price is later increased,
36
price.
receive the higher
A few general observations are in order. First, just as Congress
did not attempt to prohibit proxy fights with the proxy provisions
of the 1934 Act, so it also did not intend to prohibit tender offers.
It wished to regulate the process and tried to draft legislation which
would be neutral as between incumbent management and the tender
offeror.3 7 In most takeover situations, time is on the side of incum32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1984).
33. Id. § 240.14e-1.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1986); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1984).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1986).
36. Id. § 78n(d)(7). The reverse is not true, so that the "first tier" of a tender
offer may achieve control at one price and then the acquirer may offer a lower price
to obtain the remainder of the stock. However, certain state legislation seeks to
regulate this so-called front-end loaded, two-tier tender offer practice. See infra Part
VIII.

37. See supra note 31; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982).
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bent management of the target company. The longer the takeover is
delayed, the more chance management has to take defensive action,
look for a white knight, and let the arbitrageurs keep their funds
tied up in purchased stock. While the Commission's selection of a
minimum offer period of twenty business days is said to be a neutral
provision, empirical data is lacking to support the assertion. In any
event, most proposals, state or federal, made in support of target
company managements are designed to lengthen that twenty-day
period. Second, while Federal regulation has increased the legal fees
and other expenses of the hostile takeover via the cash tender offer,
these expenses have not dampened the enthusiasm of corporate
raiders. One reason for the expansion of takeover activity is that
pension fund trustees and other fiduciaries switched sides. In the old
proxy fight days, bank trust officers and other trustees holding stock
tended to vote for incumbent management. But now in the cash
tender offer situation, trustees were presented with a clearer choice:
cash out the stock now at the higher tender price or miss the
opportunity to maximize short-term yield. That choice seems clear
to the trust's beneficiaries who might sue the trustee for breach of
fiduciary duties. Thus, fund managers and other trustees are persuaded to sell, rather than to stick with current management. In
addition, more stock is now held in trust. One major cause was the
passage of ERISA in 1974,38 which has expanded the size and volume
of pension funds. Also, as more and various types of mutual funds
place greater amounts of corporate stock in the hands of money
managers, their search to maximize short-term yield leads them to
cash in on a tender offer. Incumbent management's best ally is often
the individual shareholder who may resist a tender offer through
sentiment, confusion or inattention. Third, an entire new vocabulary
has developed to delight the press: the "Saturday'Night Special",
"poison pills", the "pac-man" defense, "scorched earth" and "lockups", "shark repellents", "golden parachutes" (and now "tin parachutes"), "bear-hugs", "white knights", "greenmail", etc. 9 Fourth,
the tender offer has provided the context for a recent and explosive
expansion of director and officer liability. And fifth, state legislatures have not been happy with the Congressional neutrality behind
the Williams Act. It seemed that state legislatures were more ame38. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974).
39. L. Loss, supra note 20, at 499-502 (a glossary of this "financial slang" is
provided).
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nable to pressures from the incumbent management of local companies.
IV.

THE FIRST GENERATION STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER STATUTES

The lifespan of the first generation state statutes lasted from
March 1968 to June 1982, when the United States Supreme Court
decided Edgar v. MITE Corp.40 Virginia enacted the first state antitakeover statute in March 1968,' 41 and was soon followed by Ohio in
1969.42 By 1982, a vast majority of the states had followed suit, with43
thirty-seven having enacted some kind of "mini-Williams Act."
While the mechanism adopted by these statues varied, most seemed
to be based upon a desire to protect local incumbent management
from hostile tender offers. 44
It first appeared that the Idaho Takeover Statute45 would be the
vehicle for a determination of the validity of state statutes which
seemed to interfere with the operation of the Williams Act. In Great
Western United Corp. v. KidweII 46, a U.S. District Court in Texas
held the Idaho statute unconstitutional, under the doctrine of preemption, because the Idaho statute conflicted with the Williams Act
"by destroying the careful balance struck in the Williams Act
between the offeror and the management of the target company
designed to protect the interests of the shareholders.1 47 The court
found that under the Commerce Clause the Idaho statute was neither
legitimate nor local in its application. 4 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
in an opinion by Judge John Miner Wisdom. 49 The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed 0 but only on a venue question.
40. 457 U.S. 624, (1982).
41. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to 13.1-541 (1985) (effective Mar. 5, 1968).

42. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page 1985).
43. By the date of the MITE decision, the Court would refer to 37 states with
takeover statutes. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631 n.6. See also, Warren, Developments in
State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAw 671 (1985).
44. For example, Bartell lists 27 state statutes as excluding "friendly" offers if

approved by the target company's board. J. Bartell, State Take-Over Laws: A Survey,
Ninth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, Vol. 1, PLI, Nov. 10-12, 1977, at
361-63.
45. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to 30-1513 (1980).

46.
rev'd on
47.
48.
49.

439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex., 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978),
other grounds, 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
Great W. United Corp., 439 F. Supp. at 437.
Id. at 437-39.
Great W. United Corp., 577 F.2d 1256 (5th. Cir., 1978), rev'd on other

grounds, 443 U.S. 173 (1979).

50. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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The fate of the first generation state anti-takeover statutes was
later decided in Edgar v. MITE Corp., holding the Illinois Business
Take-Over Act5 2 (the "Illinois Act") unconstitutional.
The Illinois Act applied to target corporations which met one
of the following "nexus" tests. Either 10% of its stock was held by
security holders "located in this State" according to postal address
or the target met two of the following three criteria: its principal
office was in Illinois, or it was incorporated in Illinois, or at least
10%o of its stated capital and paid-in surplus was "represented in
this State." 53 A takeover offer was unlawful unless registered under
the Illinois Act.5 4 The registration statement to be filed with the
Secretary of State contained much of the same information as
required by the Williams Act." A copy of the registration statement
needed to be delivered to the target company "not later than the
56
date of filing" of such statement with the Secretary of State.
Normally, the offer "shall become registered 20 business days after
the date of filing," unless accelerated or delayed by specified procedures.5 7 The Act called for hearings to be held by the Secretary of
State if "necessary for the protection of offerees in this State" and
if the Secretary finds, inter alia, "that the take-over offer is inequitable," he can deny registration.58 Thus, the Illinois Act extended
the twenty-day Williams Act period by an additional twenty days or
longer, by requiring a pre-offering filing, and also by allowing the
Illinois Secretary of State to determine the fairness of the offer.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE
Corp. was neither clear nor helpful in guiding lower courts as they
began to examine the other, different state statutes. There were six
written opinions. The lead opinion, by Justice White, had nine
subsections, three of which were identified as the "Opinion of the
Court."
The offeror, MITE Corporation, was incorporated in Delaware
and had its principal offices in Connecticut. The target company,
51. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51 to 137.70 (1982), repealed by
Public Act No. 83-365, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2628 (West).
53. Id. at para. 137.52-10. The last requirement of capital and paid-in surplus
"represented in this state" adopts the language of the Illinois corporate franchise tax
system, now in the Business Corporation Act.
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54(A) (1982).
55. Id. at para. 137.54(C).
56. Id. at para. 137.54(B).
57. Id. at para. 137.54(E).
58. I1d. at para. 137.57.
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Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., was incorporated in Illinois and
conducted most of its business in Pennsylvania. The MITE Corporation made its Williams Act filings, did not make any Illinois filing,
and filed suit in Federal District Court in Chicago for a declaratory
judgment that the Illinois Act "was preempted by the Williams Act
and violated the Commerce Clause." 5 9 Four of the justices thought
the case was moot. Five justices were able to agree on a discussion
of the application of the Supremacy Clause. They noted:
There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress
was aware of state takeover laws when it enacted the Williams
Act. When the Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only
Virginia had a takeover statute. The Virginia statute, Va.
Code §13.1-528 (1978), became effective March 5, 1968; the
Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19,
1968. Takeover statutes are now in effect in 37 States. 60
The point on which five justices could agree, subsection V-B of
Justice White's opinion, was that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional as a violation of the Commerce Clause, 61 as an undue burden
upon interstate commerce. Only four justices thought the Act was
62
also preempted by the Williams Act.
The question was now how this opinion would affect the thirtysix other state takeover statutes. To be constitutional after MITE, a
state statute would need to be drawn narrowly enough to: 1) be
substantially consistent with the Williams Act, 2) be not unduly
burdensome to interstate commerce, and 3) preserve the state's
legitimate interest in protecting local investors. Several state statutes
were found to be unconstitutional and several others were found to
63
be pre-empted.
59. MITE, 457 U.S. at 628.
60. Id. at 631 n.6, citing Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation:
State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 Oio ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981).
61. Id. at 636-39.

62. Id. at 639-40.

63. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1978)
(Idaho statute violates Commerce and Supremacy Clauses), rev'd on other ground
sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Dart Indus., Inc.
v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware statutes violates Commerce
and Supremacy Clauses); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(Pennsylvania statute violates Commerce and Supremacy Clauses); Kennecott Corp.
v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey statute violates Supremacy Clause);
Seagram & Sons v. Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98, 247 (E.D. La. 1979) (Louisiana statute violates Supremacy Clause); Eure v. Grand
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In the aftermath of MITE, several Circuit Courts applied the
64
Supreme Court's decision to strike down state takeover statutes.
Most of the remaining first generation statutes were gutted by the
new SEC Rule 14d-2(b) which required that a tender offer be
commenced within five days after any public announcement of the
identity of bidder and target company. 65 Only the First Circuit
refrained from doing so when the takeover provisions of the Massachusetts statute were challenged. 66 These decisions appeared to
leave little room for state tender offer regulation.
V.

THE SECOND GENERATION STATUTES

The next attempts to assist local managements took several
forms. Some were statutes whose operation kicked in after completion of the tender offer. Some purported to regulate only the internal
affairs of a corporation. The major types became known as "business combination," "fair price" and "control share acquisition"
statutes.
The New York statute is a "business combination" statute which
has excited interest in Illinois and other states. 67 It applies to "resiMetropolitan Ltd., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED.. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97, 694 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 1980) (North Carolina Statute violates Supremacy Clause); Natomas Co.
v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada statute violates Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses); Kelly ex rel. McLaughlin v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51,
302 N.W.20 596 (1981) (Michigan statute violates Supremacy Clause). See also,
Profusek & Gompt., State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue
Sky, or Corporation Law' Concepts, 7 CoRP. L. REV. 3 (1983); Sheffer, The
Unconstitutionality of State Insurance Takeover Statutes: An Unfortunate But
Not Necessarily Final Result, 69 MINN. L. REV. 821 (1985); Block, Burton &
Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation," 13 SEC. REo. L.J. 332
(1986); Note, State Regulation of Tender Offers: Legislating Within the Constitutional Framework, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1986); Pinto, Takeover Statutes:
The Dormant Commerce Clause and State CorporateLaw, 41 U. MLAMI L. REV.
473 (1987); Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited Defense of State Tender Offer
Disclosure Requirements, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 657 (1987); Pozen, The New Round
of State Tender Offer Statutes, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 89 (1987); Shipman, In
Defense of Reasonable State Regulation of Tender Offers, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV.
99 (1987).
64. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th
Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma statute); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir.
1983) (Virginia statute); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th
Cir. 1982) (Michigan statute); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122
(8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri statute).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984) (effective Dec. 6, 1979).
66. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
67. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986) (effective Dec. 16, 1985).
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dent domestic corporations" which are defined as those incorporated
in New York, have their main office and significant business operations there and at least 10 percent of the voting stock is owned by
New York residents. 6 For such target corporations, any person who
buys 20 percent or more of its stock may not subsequently "engage
in any business combination" with it for five years unless such
person had the target board's approval before such person's purchase
of stock. 69 There are other provisions, including an authorization
for new corporations to "opt out" of the statute and for existing
corporations to opt out before March 31, 1986.70
An example of a "fair price" statute is a 1985 amendment to
the Illinois Business Corporation Act. 7' The new section requires
two shareholder votes to ratify any of a list of business combinations:
a vote of 80 percent of the shareholders and a majority of disinterested shareholders. 72 This higher vote is not required if either of the
following conditions are met: two-thirds of the disinterested directors
approve of the business combination or the shareholders receive a
73
fair price for their shares under a complicated formula.
A different approach was started by an Ohio statute. 74 Ohio
was the first state to act after the MITE decision. 75 The Ohio statute
applied to any "issuing public corporation," defined as a "domestic
corporation with fifty or more shareholders that has its principal
place of business, principal executive offices or substantial assets
within this state and as to which no valid close corporation agreement
exists ....
,,76 What was regulated was a "control share acquisition," defined as the acquisition of any shares which would push
the acquirer over any one of three thresholds: one-fifth, one-third
or a majority of the voting power. 77 The basic provision then
prohibited any such "control share acquisition" unless made with

68. Id. j 912(a)(13).
69. Id. § 912(b). There is a six-part definition of "business combination" in
§ 912(a)(5).
70. Id. § 912(d)(3).
71. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985).
72. Id. at para. 7.85(A)(1).
73. Id. at para. 7.85(B).
74. Omo REv. CODE § 1701.831 (Page 1985) (effective Nov. 19, 1982).
75. See generally Note, Has Ohio Avoided the Wake of MITE? An Analysis
of the Constitutionalityof the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act, 46 Omo ST. L.J.
203 (1985).
76. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(Y) (Page 1985).
77. Id. § 1701.01(Z).
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the prior authorization of the shareholders of the corporation."8 Any
person proposing to make such a control share acquisition needed
to deliver an "acquiring person statement" to the corporation. 79 A
special meeting of the shareholders is then called and the control
share acquisition may be made if both of two votes are obtained: a
majority of all shareholders and a majority of disinterested shareholders*80
The Ohio statute was soon tested and found wanting. In Fleet
Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman,8 l the Sixth Circuit held the statute
unconstitutional on two grounds. First, the Ohio statute frustrated
the objectives of the Williams Act and thus violated the Supremacy
Clause.8 2 In addition, its burden on interstate commerce violated the
Commerce Clause.8 3 Meanwhile, other state statutes were also being

tested .84
No matter how interesting the Ohio statute would have become,
attention turned to the variation adopted in Indiana as the Control
Share Acquisition Chapter of the Indiana Business Corporation
Law.85 That was the statute upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, in

April 1987, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.8 6 Since a
statute with the Supreme Court's imprimatur has become the statute
to copy, a brief analysis of the Indiana scheme should be given.

VI.

THE INDIANA STATUTE

The Indiana Chapter is very similar to the Ohio statute. The
"nexus" with Indiana is provided by the definition of the target
company affected, the "issuing public corporation." First, it is a
''corporation," which is defined in the general definitions for the
entire Indiana Business Corporation Law as "any corporation formed
78. Id. § 1701.831(A).
79. Id. § 1701.831(B).
80. Id. § 1701.831(E).
81. 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub. nom., Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace
Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (1987).
82. Fleet Aerospace, 796 F.2d at 139.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986) (HAW.
REv. STAT. §§ 416-171 & 416-172 (1985)); APL v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp.
1216 (D. Minn. 1985) (MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.011 (37)-(40), 302A.449(7) and 302A.671
(1985 and West Supp. 1988)); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
85. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).

86. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
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under this Act." 8' 7 In addition to being a domestic Indiana corporation the target must meet three other tests: it must have one
hundred or more shareholders, it must have its principal place of
business or its principal office or substantial assets in Indiana and
third, it must meet one of three shareholder tests. The three shareholder tests are: more than ten percent of its shareholders reside in
Indiana, more than ten percent of its shares are owned by Indiana
88
residents or there are ten thousand shareholder residents in Indiana.
"Control shares" are the items whose purchase is regulated.
They are defined as whatever shares a person would acquire and
which would have the effect of placing such person's voting strength
"within any of the following ranges of voting power:" one-fifth to
one-third; or one-third or more but less than a majority; or a
majority or more. 9
Whenever "control shares" are acquired in a "control share
acquisition, '" 90 those shares retain their previous voting right only if
a proper resolution is voted upon and approved by the shareholders. 91
That resolution must pass two votes: a majority of all shares and a
majority of all shares which are not "interested shares." ' 92 Interested
shares are those involved in a "control share acquisition," those
voted by an officer of the target corporation and those voted by
inside directors of the target company. 93 A person who has made or
proposes to make a control share acquisition may deliver an "acquiring person statement" to the target company and request a
special meeting of the shareholders with the hope of enfranchising
such person's shares. 94 The entire scheme has an opt-out provision:
the target company's articles or by-laws may provide that chapter
42 does not apply provided such article or by-law was in place before
the control share acquisition in question. 9
87. IrD. CODE ANN. § 23-1-1-1(a) (West Supp. 1987). The new Indiana Bus.
Corp. Law. § 23-1-20-5 defines "corporation" as "a corporation for profit that is
not a foreign corporation, incorporated under or subject to the provisions of this
article." The old Act was repealed as of August 1, 1987, after the CTS opinion. The
new definitions chapter went into effect on April 1, 1986. Chapter 42, the Control
Share Acquisition Chapter, also went into effect on April 1, 1986.
88. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (West Supp. 1987).
89. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West Supp. 1987).
90. "Control share acquisition" is defined in § 23-1-42-1, which also exempts
a number of transactions. See infra Appendix 2 at pp. 359-65.
91. Id. § 23-1-42-9(a).

92. Id. § 23-1-42-9(b).

93. Id. § 23-1-42-3.
94. Id. §§ 23-1-42-6, 42-1-42-7.

95. Id. § 23-1-42-5.
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The Indiana Statute has some ambiguities and raises some
concerns for states proposing to imitate that scheme. Many of these
concerns relate to perceived loopholes or inconsistencies with what
may have been the basic intent of the legislation. Whether the
following comments could be characterized as pro management or
as pro acquiror, the purpose is to highlight problems with the
legislation. Examples and scenarios are included to illustrate the
issues, and reference is also hereby made to the complete text of the
Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter which is appended to
this Symposium. 96
A.

"CONTROL SHARES"

The statute's language states that only those shares which push
shareholdings within the enumerated ranges would be control shares
and thus subject to voting disenfranchisement. It may have been
intended that all shares purchased in a control share acquisition, as
defined, would constitute control shares. If so, clarifying language
would be necessary. For example, if a 10% shareholder acquires
another 12% and thus exceeds the 20% level set forth in the statute,
the language can be interpreted to mean that only the 2% within the
range constitutes "control shares." It is believed that the intent was
to include the entire 12% acquisition within the definition of control
shares, but the language is not clear.
It would seem that, once shareholder approval is received for
shareholdings within a certain range and the shares are re-enfranchised, further acquisitions within that range can be made without
the need of further approval. Otherwise, the concept of several
ranges makes no sense. The language is ambiguous on this point and
should be clarified. For example: If the 22% shareholder in the
previous example acquires another 2% (the upper limit of the range
being 33 1/3%), further approval (re-enfranchisement) should not
be required.
The definition of control shares focuses on "person" and does
not contemplate concerted action by a group. A provision closing
this gap would be in order. For example, each of 3 people acting as
a group acquire 15%. Since none of them are within the enumerated
ranges, no shareholder approval is necessary even though the practical effect of their joint holdings is the same as that where one
individual purchases 45% of the shares.

96. See infra Appendix 2 at pp. 359-65.
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"CONTROL SHARE ACQUISITION"

If any of the changes discussed in A above were made, then
corresponding changes in Section 23-1-42-2 would be necessary.
The exclusions in subsection (d) from acquisitions of shares
constituting control share acquisitions should be significantly expanded. For example, intra-family transfers, transfers for estate or
tax planning and other legitimate planning are not covered.
The current language would include the normal solicitation of
proxies ("in respect to which a person may exercise or direct the
exercise of voting power ... ") within the coverage of the statute.
Such situations were probably not intended to fall within the
acquisition of control shares and should be excepted.
Subsection (e) provides that once a person has received shareholder approval the shares can be transferred without the need for
further approval. It is the person owning the shares rather than the
shares themselves that should be scrutinized. For example, Shareholder A has received shareholder approval with respect to his or
her position. He or she transfers this position to a person who
shareholders do not approve. The statute seems to allow this transfer
to occur.
Note that changing the language in subsection (e) to clarify that
the focus is on the holder rather than on the shares themselves
makes the exclusions in subsection (d) all the more critical.
Consistent with the position that disenfranchisement should
follow the person and not the shares, a person who does not receive
the requisite shareholder approval to vote the control shares should
be allowed to transfer these shares without having the shares remain
disenfranchised. For example, a 25%/o shareholder not receiving
shareholder approval should be able to transfer shares without
restriction. However, if a transferee acquires control shares in his or
her own right due to his or her shareholdings falling within an
enumerated range, shareholder approval is necessary as to these
acquisitions.
C.

"ISSUING PUBLIC CORPORATION"

This section establishes the constitutional nexus with the state
that the Supreme Court found important in CTS. While one could
agree that the constitutional nexus must be established, problems
may arise with the practical application of the nexus parameters.
For instance, since shares held by banks, brokers or nominees are
excluded for purposes of calculating the numbers and percentages,
a publicly held corporation with a number of shares held in street
name may not meet the 100 shareholder requirement.

i988:203]
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APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 5

Section 23-1-42-5 permits a corporation to opt-out from the
application of the control share provisions. The opt-out can be
through the Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws. A problem may
arise with manipulation by the board (opting out through amendment
of the By-laws) without vote of the shareholders. While the directors
have fiduciary duties to the shareholders, manipulation can occur
with the timing of the opt-out and, by implication, a subsequent
opt-in by again amending the Articles or By-Laws.
For example, assume a bidding war for control of a corporation
is in progress. One person acquires control shares but does not
receive the requisite shareholder vote. It appears that the other
bidder could not receive shareholder approval either but the board
supports the bid and opts out of the control share provisions so as
to avoid a shareholder vote on the voting rights of the control shares.
E.

"ACQUIRING PERSON STATEMENT"

Some questions exist as to exactly what is presented to the
shareholders at the meeting of approval of the control share acquisition. It would be better if the acquiring person statement must
contain the form of resolution to be voted on at the meeting.
F.

"SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS"

The acquiring person must give an undertaking to the corporation to pay its expenses if a special meeting of shareholders is

requested. Anyone intending to acquire control shares can request a
meeting for approval to vote the shares without the necessity of
having actually bought the shares. Therefore actual deposit of funds
with the corporation may be necessary to ensure that only those
serious about the acquisition request the meeting. Otherwise, disgruntled and impecunious parties not actually intending to acquire
shares, in spite of their declared intentions, may harass corporations
into calling special shareholder meetings.
G.

VOTING RIGHTS

If the requisite shareholder approval is not obtained, the control
shares have no vote. Aside from the issue of disenfranchisement and
inability to vote the shares on any matters (e.g., voting on fundamental corporate changes and changes peculiar to that class of shares
such as reduction of mandatory dividends), there is a concern about
the control shares being unable to vote regardless of subsequent
dilution or other changes in the corporation. For example, a person
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has a 25 0o control share position which has not received shareholder
approval. Subsequent issuances of stock by the corporation reduce
the shareholdings to 1007o but, because of the original characterization of the shares as control shares, they continue to be unable to
vote..
As presently worded, the resolution as to voting control shares
must be approved by:
i) a majority of all votes entitled to be cast by a "voting
group" entitled to vote separately on the proposal and
ii) a majority of all disinterested shares.
"Voting group" is a term in the Indiana statute that has no
counterpart in other state corporation statutes, such as Illinois.
Furthermore, the focal point of the vote should be the majority of
the disinterested shares and a majority of all the shares of a class
should vote only if the proposed control share acquisition would
result in certain fundamental changes to that class.
H.

REDEMPTION

If control shares are not able to vote, the corporation has the
ability to redeem the shares at fair market value pursuant to procedures adopted by the corporation. Fair value is defined in Section
23-1-42-11 (dissenters' rights) as not less than the highest price per
share paid by the acquiring person in the control share acquisition.
This concept could also be applied to Section 23-1-42-10. While it
may result in a premium being paid to the acquiring person, the
redemption is at the corporation's election without the consent of
the acquiring person. One could become concerned about the ability
to redeem shares ex parte, but the acquiring person does know
beforehand that the shares are callable if the shareholder approval
is not obtained.
The preceding discussion points out perceived defects in the
Indiana statute 97 but one cannot overlook its greatest strength: it
was held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court. In the
97. A joint task force composed of members of the American Bar Association
and the North American Securities Administrators Association has drafted a model
"control share" statute which addresses many of the ambiguities of the Indiana

Control Acquisitions Chapter and considers other substantive issues involving the
concepts behind "control share" legislation. A public exposure draft of the model
"control share" statute has been released and the deadline for submitting public
comments expired March 15, 1988.
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CTS decision, Justice Powell found that the Williams Act did not
pre-empt the Indiana statute. 98 He also found that the Indiana statute
was not such a burden on interstate commerce as to violate the
Commerce Clause. 99 It was in this discussion in which he made the
now famous "moreover" statement:
We agree that Indiana has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations. But this
Act applies only to corporations incorporated in Indiana. We
reject the contention that Indiana has no interest in providing
for the shareholders of its corporations the voting autonomy
granted by the Act. Indiana has a substantial interest in
preventing the corporate form from becoming a shield for
unfair business dealing. Moreover, unlike the Illinois statute
invalidated in MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a substantial number of shareholders in
Indiana. See Ind. Code § 23-1-42-4(a)(3) (Supp. 1986). Thus,
every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial
number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has
an interest in protecting.' 0o
Taking their cue from this observation, commentators predict
that any other state anti-takeover must meet both tests: it must apply
only to target companies incorporated in that state and there must
be sufficient other nexus to warrant the burden on interstate commerce. For example, Delaware has many major corporations incorporated there but few have a major commercial nexus with Delaware.
Thus, difficulties are encountered in drafting a Delaware takeover
statute which would be constitutional.

VII. THE DELAWARE STATUTE
A response different from the Indiana "control share" approach
has been taken in Delaware. On February 2, 1988 the Governor of
the State of Delaware signed into law legislation which adds a new
Section 203 to the Delaware General Corporation Law.' 0o Section
203 is a "business combination" statute' 02 intended to regulate
98. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644-47.
99. Id. at 1648-52.
100. Id. at 1651-52 (emphasis in original).
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
102. See supra Section IV, and infra Section VIII, for a description and
comparison of the three dominant forms of state anti-takeover legislation: "control
share," "business combination," and "fair price".
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takeovers of companies incorporated in Delaware. Immediately after
Section 203 became effective, Campeau Corp. (which was bidding
for Federated Department Stores) and The Black & Decker Corporation (which is bidding for American Standard, Inc.) each filed suit
seeking to enjoin enforcement of Section 203 on various grounds
including its unconstitutionality under the federal Supremacy and
Commerce Clauses.103
°4
The precipitating cause of the Delaware legislation was CTS,'
in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter. 0 5 Since the
°6
Supreme Court had invalidated the Illinois Business Takeover Act'
in MITE0 7 in 1982, the status of state takeover legislation had been
in a state of flux. However, since CTS, a number of states have
enacted control share legislation 1 and others have pending bills
contemplating enactment of such legislation.1°9 Delaware also considered enactment of a control share type statute similar to that
103. Section IX infra for a discussion of these constitutional issues. Black &
Decker Corporation's motion for a preliminary injunction was subsequently denied
without the court reaching the constitutional issues. Civil Action No. 88-50-CON (D.
Del. Feb. 2, 1988). Also Campeau Corp. has apparently emerged as the winner in a
bidding war with Macy's for control of Federated Department Stores. A contrary
result was rendered in RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., Civil Action No. 88-C378 (E.D. Wis. May 7, 1988), where the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin found Wisconsin's "business combination" statute to be
unconstitutional on Supremacy Clause gounds. The court did not reach the Commerce
Clause arguments. However, the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware denied an offeror's request for preliminary injuncitive relief seeking to
enjoin the application of Section 203, finding that it was probably constitutional.
BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., Civil Action No. 88-130-MMS, (D. Del. April 1, 1988). A
different offeror has also been denied preliminary injunctive relief by the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware in a finding that "the facts adduced are
insufficient to support a determination that Section 203 is most likely unconstitutional."
RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., Civil Action No. 88-190-JRR (D.
Del. May 9, 1988). In both cases, and in other recent cases challenging other state
"business combination" statutes, the Securities and Exchange Commission has filed
amicus curiae briefs urging that these statutes be held unconstitutional on Supremacy
and Commerce Clause grounds.
104. CTS, 107 S. Ct. 1637.
105. IN . CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).
106. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, para. 137.51 to 137.70 (1985).
107. MITE, 457 U.S. 624.
108. Thirteen states have enacted anti-takeover statutes since CTS. See Sontag,
Takeovers Are on the Rise Again, Nat'l. L.J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
109. For instance, Illinois has several pending bills which are verbatim copies of
the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter. See supra Section VI.
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adopted by Indiana prior to the conclusion of the Delaware 1987
legislative session in June of 1987. However, the Corporation Law
Section of the Delaware Bar Association elected not to propose such
legislation to the Delaware legislature at that time. Among the
reasons were the concerns of hastily enacting legislation prior to the
end of the 1987 legislative session without a reasonable opportunity
to analyze the consequences of the application of such legislation
and the belief that control share legislation would not adequately
act as a deterrent to hostile takeovers. After further review and
debate, the Corporation Law Committee of the Delaware Bar Association formulated and submitted a bill that ultimately was adopted
as Section 203 on February 2, 1988.
The following description is a summary of the pertinent provisions of Section 203 and reference is hereby made to the complete
text of Section 203 as appended to this symposium.
Basically, Section 203 provides that a corporation shall not
engage in any business combination with an interested stockholder
(as described in the following paragraph) for a period of 3 years
after such person becomes an interested stockholder except in one
of the three following situations:
1) prior to the date the stockholder becomes an interested
stockholder, the board had approved either:
a)

the business combination or

b) the transaction in which the stockholder became an
interested stockholder, or
2) upon consummation of the transaction in which the stockholder became an interested stockholder, the interested stockholder owned at least 85% of the voting stock of the
corporation excluding in determining the issued and outstanding shares those shares owned by:
a) those persons who are both directors and officers
(hereinafter referred to as "inside directors") and
b) employee stock plans in which employee participants
do not have the right to determine confidentially whether
shares under the plan will be tendered in a tender or
exchange offer, or
3) on or after such date, the business combination is approved by the board and authorized at a special or annual
stockholder meeting (not by written consent) by at least two-
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thirds of the outstanding voting stock not owned by the
interested stockholder.
An "interested stockholder" is a person who:
1) owns 15%V0 or more of the corporation's outstanding
voting stock, or
2) is an affiliate or associate of the corporation and was
the owner of 15% or more of the outstanding voting stock
at any time within the 3 year period immediately prior to the
date when the determination as to interested stockholder
status is to be made, or
3) the affiliates or associates of the foregoing persons.
There is a grandfather provision excepting out those who:
1) owned shares prior to December 23, 1987, or
2) acquired shares from such a person by gift, inheritance
or without consideration, or
3) who were bumped over 150o as a result of action on the
corporation's part, not action on the person's part.
A "business combination" is extensively defined in Section
203(c)(3). The basic intent of the legislation is to prohibit transactions
such as mergers, considerations, sales, leases, exchanges, mortgages,
issuances of securities and the like between a corporation or its
subsidiaries and an interested stockholder or which would disproportionately favor an interested stockholder over other stockholders.
A sale of assets to an unaffiliated entity would be permissible as
would a merger or consolidation with an unaffiliated entity, even if
caused by the interested stockholder unless the result of the merger
or consolidation is that the protections of Section 203 are no longer
available to the surviving corporation (e.g., a going private transaction whereby the surviving corporation would no longer be publicly
traded).
Section 203 will not apply to a corporation under a number of
situations:
1) a corporation can opt out by a provision in its original
Certificate of Incorporation.
2) within 90 days of the effective date of Section 203, the
board can amend the By-Laws to opt out.
3) the stockholders can amend the Certificate of Incorpo-
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ration or By-Laws to opt out but such action will not be
effective for 12 months and shall not apply to any business
combination with an interested stockholder who becomes
such on or prior to the adoption of the amendment.
4) a corporation does not have a class of stock:
a) listed on a national stock exchange;
b)

NASDAQ listed or

c) held of record by at least 2,000 stockholders unless the
corporation cannot meet any of these tests due to action
taken by an interested stockholder.
5) a stockholder becomes an interested stockholder inadvertently, was not an interested stockholder within the last three
years and divests shares as soon as practicable to fall below
the 15o level.
6) a business combination with another party is proposed
which is approved or not opposed by a majority of the then
directors who were directors before any person became an
interested stockholder within the last three years or were
elected or recommended for election to succeed such directors
by a majority of such directors (a so-called "white knight"
scenario) and an interested stockholder counters with his or
her own proposal after the date the first proposal is announced but before it is consummated or abandoned.
A corporation can opt in by amending its certificate of incorporation, but the opt in cannot restrict a business combination
between the corporation and an interested stockholder if he or she
became such prior to the adoption of the amendment.
One practical problem that arises under the definition of "business combination" occurs when a corporation extends a rights
offering to its stockholders or otherwise attempts to raise capital
through the stockholders. The concept of the "business combination" definition is to cover those transactions in which an interested
stockholder obtains preferential treatment over other stockholders.
In the context of a rights offering, it is likely that not all of the
stockholders will exercise their rights resulting in an increase in
proportionate share of the securities by an interested stockholder
who exercises. Thus, a prohibited business combination is the result.
Similarly, a ready avenue of funds for a corporation which is
financially troubled would be through loans or other accommoda-
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tions from its stockholders. However, the ability of the corporation

to give adequate security may be jeopardized if doing so gives an
interested stockholder a disproportionate benefit. In these types of

situations, it is arguable that it is the corporation receiving a benefit
more than an interested stockholder receiving preferential treatment.

Nonetheless, Section 203 as presently drafted would include these

transactions within the scope of a business combination which cannot
take place unless there is compliance with Section 203.110
VIII.

COMPARISON OF STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER LEGISLATION

State legislatures today are facing a situation in which the first

tier of state takeover statutes were struck down by MITE, one of
the newer types (control share) has been upheld in CTS, and the two
other major new types (business combination and fair price) have
yet to be conclusively tested. I" These major types and their variations

will now be briefly compared.
The "control share" statutes, as upheld in CTS, generally
provide that shareholders in excess of any one of three thresholds20%0, 33 1/3% and 50%-must receive the approval of a majority

of shares of the "disinterested" shareholders before such shares are
allowed to vote. The definition of "disinterested" excludes the shares
held by both an acquiror and incumbent management. The practical
effect of a "control share" statute is that a bidder for a corporation
will condition purchase of shares exceeding a threshold upon prior
approval of a majority of the "disinterested" shareholders.
States incorporating "fair price" provisions into their corporation
statutes" 2 attempt to regulate the abuses of front-end loaded, two110. If the corporation is in dire need of the funds and can only obtain such
funds through a prohibited business combination, the stockholders presumably would
cooperate in opting out of § 203 coverage by amending the corporation's certificate
of incorporation, but such action would not be effective for 12 months and will not
apply to any business combination with a pre-existing interested stockholder unless
the business combination is approved by the board and authorized by at least twothirds of the outstanding shares (excluding those shares held by the interested
stockholder). Another possibility would be where the interested stockholder gained
control of the board of directors and the board subsequently opted out of § 203.
However, such action must be taken by May 2, 1988, so this provision will be of
limited use.
111. However, see supra note 102 in which two Delaware federal district court
decisions have denied motions for preliminary injunctions seeking to enjoin the
application of Section 203.
112. See, e.g., Section 7.85 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983.
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985). See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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tier tender offers where shareholders are induced to tender their
shares in an initial tender offer for fear that, if they do not tender,
they will be merged out at a lower price in the second phase of the
transaction following a successful tender offer. "Fair price" provisions are to assure shareholders that the same price must be paid in
the second freeze-out phase as in the initial tender offer. This would
'3
close a perceived gap in the Williams Act."
"Business combination" statutes regulate takeovers by preventing, unless certain conditions are met, follow up mergers or other
specified transactions that an acquiror often desires to effectuate
following acquisition of control of a corporation. As distinguished
from the "control share" statutes, shares owned by an "interested
stockholder" under a "business combination" statute remain able
to vote.
These three basic forms of state anti-takeover legislation are not
mutually exclusive. Many states have combined the protections of
these forms."14 Also, each form of legislation varies from state to
state."'

113. See supra note 22.
114. For example, Indiana has "control share" and "business combination"

provisions, IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1988), and IND.

CODE ANN.

§ 23-

1-43 (West Supp. 1988). Illinois has a "fair price" provision, §7.85 of the Illinois
Business Corporation Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985), and is contemplating "control share" and "business combination" legislation. A serious issue exists
as to whether a "control share" statute would be constitutional in Illinois under that
state's constitution. See Roanke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar, 101 Ill. 2d 315, 461 N.E.2d
1365 (1984).
115. For example, Ohio's "control share" statute does not allow purchase of
shares unless the articles or the regulations of the corporation provide that the
"control share" provision does not apply, or the requisite vote is obtained, Olno
REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985), whereas Indiana allows purchase but
disenfranchises voting rights unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws provide
that the "control share" chapter does not apply, or the requisite disinterested
shareholder vote is obtained. Also, while Delaware modeled § 203 after the New
York "business combination" statute, § 203 was purposely made less restrictive in a
number of respects:
1) three years rather than five is used for the freeze out period;
2) an interested shareholder is able to compete with a "white knight"
without the constraints of § 203 if a business combination with such "white
knight" is proposed;
3) the freeze can be avoided by acquiring 85% of the outstanding shares
(excluding inside director shares in making the determination); and
4) New York has fair price provisions after the freeze; Delaware does not
regulate the pricing of the transactions.
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"Control share" statutes purport to emphasize the right of
shareholders not associated with an acquiror or incumbent management to determine the voting rights of a person reaching the specified
shareholding thresholds. On the other hand, "business combination"
statutes give a corporation's board of directors a more active voice
(and, as a practical matter, a veto power in some situations) in
determining the fate of the corporation. Under Delaware's Section
203, it is possible for a business combination to occur within the
three year period if at least two-thirds of the stockholders (excluding
the shares owned by the interested stockholder) approve it, but the
board of directors also must approve the transaction. Furthermore,
in calculating the two-thirds majority, shares owned by incumbent
management are able to vote; only those of the acquiror are excluded. Stockholders of an existing corporation may also opt out of
the applicability of Delaware's Section 203 by amending the corporation's certificate of incorporation or by-laws, but such action is not
effective for 12 months and does not apply to any business combination with an interested stockholder who becomes such on or prior
to such amendment. Thus, an argument can be made that a "business
combination" statute impermissibly favors management over an
acquiror and violates the balance that is intended by the Williams
Act." 6 However, directors remain liable for breaches of their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation so they do not
have unfettered discretion." 7
On the other hand, Section 203 does not prohibit an acquiror's
purchase of shares or disenfranchise the vote of those shares, and
allows an interested stockholder to seek board representation and
even control." 8 Also, as soon as another party proposes a business
combination and the terms of Section 203(b)(6) are otherwise met,
116. See supra Section III and also the federal preemption discussion in Section
IX infra as to the Supremacy Clause argument.
One possible consequence of the "business combination" type statute is a return
to proxy fights by a potential acquiror prior to becoming an interested stockholder.
After a successful proxy fight in which an acquiror obtains control of a board, the
board would then approve a business combination prior to the person becoming an
interested stockholder.
117. The business judgment rule governing the actions of directors in takeover
situations may ultimately be more important than the scheme of Delaware's Section
203. The explosion of that field of law beginning with Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), may result in there being two sets of laws regarding a director's
duty of care: one for ordinary times and another for takeover situations.
118. Such representation would, of course, depend on the number of shares
owned and be subject to staggered board and other defensive provisions.
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an interested stockholder is able to counter with his or her own
proposal subsequent to the first proposal's announcement 'but prior
to its consummation or abandonment.
IX.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

In general, the inquiries into the constitutionality of state antitakeover legislation have focused on two aspects: the Supremacy
Clause" 9 and the Commerce Clause 20 of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause has given rise to the doctrine of
federal preemption. As to state anti-takeover statutes, the Illinois
Business Takeover Act was struck down in MITE in part because it
impermissibly deviated from the concept of neutrality under the
Williams Act as between management and an acquiror. On the other
hand, the Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter was held in
CTS to protect the independent shareholders from both management
and acquirers 2 ' and did not frustrate the purposes of the federal
law. The Commerce Clause, where a state law indirectly affects
interstate commerce, involves a balancing of the statewide benefits
against the burdens on interstate commerce in determining constitutionality. Direct regulation is per se invalid. 22 In upholding the
Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter as not violative of the
Commerce Clause, CTS reaffirmed the internal affairs doctrine
which provides that a state has the ability to regulate the internal
affairs of corporations organized within its boundaries.
Under a Supremacy Clause analysis, it is arguable that Section
203 frustrates the goal of neutrality under the Williams Act by
unduly favoring corporate management over an offeror or acquiror
of that corporation's stock. 23 If so, Section 203 would violate the
119. "This Constitution, and the Law of the United States which shall be made

in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land. .

.,

anything in the

Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONSr.
art. IV, cl. 2.
120. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority "(t)o regulate commerce
...among the several States .. ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
121. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
122. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
123. See supra the discussion in Section VIII. On the other hand, the Williams
Act governs tender offers while § 203 governs business combinations and not the
purchase of shares pursuant to a tender offer. It is possible to comply with both the
Williams Act and § 203. However, § 203 does indirectly affect the tender offer
process by regulating the steps that can be taken after a successful tender offer and
thus serving to discourage takeovers not supported by management.
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Supremacy Clause and be preempted by the Williams Act. Justice
Powell, in the CTS majority opinion, stated that:
S..

[T]he overriding concern of the MITE plurality was that

the Illinois statute considered in that case operated to favor
management against offerors, to the detriment of shareholders. By contrast, the statute now before the Court protects
the independent shareholder against both of the contending
parties. Thus, the Act furthers a basic purpose of the Wil-

liams Act.

... 124

Also, from a federal preemption standpoint, it is arguable that
the three year freeze period on business combinations imposes an
impermissible delay that conflicts with the Williams Act tender offer
time period. The statute in MITE was held to impermissibly delay
consummation of tender offers because it gave the Illinois Secretary
of State the right to hold hearings to determine fairness and thus
introduced the potential for indefinite delays in an offeror consummating the tender offers. 125 The Indiana statute upheld in CTS
provides that a shareholder meeting to determine voting rights must
be held within 50 days after a acquiror has filed an "acquiring
person statement" with the corporation. This period was held in
CTS not to be an unreasonably delay in the tender offer process.
Since Section 203 does not delay the tender offer process, this
latter federal preemption argument is not compelling. However, the
federal preemption argument based upon the neutrality of legislation
as between corporate management and an acquiror, while not conclusive, is more compelling in that Section 203 arguably tips the
126
balance too far in favor of management.
124. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1645.
125. The plurality opinion in MITE stated that an offeror should be "free to
go forward without unreasonable delay." 457 U.S. at 639. The Illinois statute also
involved a 20-day precommencement notice period which gave management time to
erect defensive positions prior to commencement of the tender offer. See supra
Section IV.
126. The Delaware district court in RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental,
Inc., Civil Action No. 88-190-JRR (D. Del. May 9, 1988), stated that Section 203
protects the independent shareholder and, while hostile tender offers are deterred
by Section 203 tha it does not preclude those hostile offers that are beneficial to
shareholders. Staley Continental, Civil Action No. 88-190-JRR, at 24. See also supra
note 103. The balance, in the view of the court, is not tipped too far in favor of
management under Section 203. Id. On the other hand, the Wisconsin district court,
in RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., Civil Action No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May
7, 1988), distinguished the "business combination" approach from the "control
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Section 203 also raises interstate commerce questions. The jurisdictional nexus of a corporation seeking the protections of Section
203 to Delaware is that it be incorporated in Delaware. The Indiana
Control Share Acquisition Chapter required not only that a corporation be incorporated in Indiana 127 but also that it have:
1) one hundred (100) or more shareholders;
2) its principal place of business, its principal office, or
substantial assets within Indiana; and
3) either;
(A) more than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders resident in Indiana;
(B) more than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by
Indiana residents; or
(C) ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in Indi28
ana.
CTS made it clear that state legislation, to be constitutional,
must apply only to corporations incorporated in that state. 29 Furthermore, the decision went on to state that:
Moreover, unlike the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE,
the Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a
substantial number of shareholders in Indiana ... Thus,
every application on the Indiana Act will effect a substantial
number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has
an interest in protecting. 3 0
Due to the language in CTS, it is debatable whether the statewide
benefits of Section 203 sufficiently outweigh the burdens on interstate
3
commerce to render it constitutional.1 '
share" and "fair price" approaches. The court stated that the former approach
enhances management rights while the latter approaches directly enhance the rights

of shareholders. According to the court, "business combination" statutes frustrate
the aim of the Williams Act of ensuring investor choices in tender offer situations.
127. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-20-5 (West Supp. 1988).
128. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (West Supp. 1988).
129. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1653. See also Telex Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp.,
No. Civ-87-2056-R (W.D. Okla. Nov. 3,1987) where the federal district court held
an Oklahoma takeover statute unconstitutional as it applied to corporations organized
outside of the state.
130. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
131. In response to the "moreover" statement in CTS, the district court in
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CONCLUSION

Due to Delaware's importance as a corporate domicile,'3 2 the
cases challenging the constitutionality of Section 203 will be followed
with interest. Section 203 suffers potential constitutional infirmities
from both a federal preemption and an interstate commerce standpoint. However, the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State
Bar Association and the Delaware legislatures believes that a "control share" response does not adequately act as a deterrent in hostile
takeovers. In adopting the "business combination" approach, the
Delaware legislature mitigated much of the harshness of the New
York statute"3 3 in an attempt to avoid legislation that would be
characterized as unduly and impermissibly pro-management and,
thus, a violation of the balance intended by the Williams Act. From
an interstate commerce standpoint, Delaware had little choice in
establishing that the sole jurisdictional nexus in Section 203 would
be incorporation in Delaware. In order to enact legislation that
would apply to the vast majority of corporations organized within
its boundaries, it could not adopt the minimum shareholder and
business contacts found in the Indiana Control Share Acquisition
Chapter. However, finding Section 203 unconstitutional from an
interstate commerce standpoint would result in a very significant
number of corporations not being able to enjoy the protections of
this type of state legislation merely due to where they chose to
incorporate. If Section 203 is unconstitutional from an interstate
commerce standpoint, one possible response by the corporate community would be a flood of reincorporations to states where corpoStaley Continental stated that the existence of these additional contacts vel non is
not constitutionally determinative and that "Delaware realizes an important local
benefit when it protects the shareholders of Delaware corporations, wheresoever the
shareholders reside." Staley Continental, Civil Action No. 88-190-JRR, at 30. Furthermore, the court noted that, by regulating only Delaware corporations, Section
203 does not impose inconsistant regulations on interstate commerce. The Staley
Continental court quoted CTS stating that "[slo long as each State regulates voting
rights [or business combinations] only in corporations it has created, each corporation
will be subject to the law of only one State." CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649. In addition,
the Staley Continental court stated that Section 203 does not discriminate against
interstate commercr because it does not favor Delawarean offerors over non-Delawarean offerors nor does it favor Delawarean shareholders over non-Delawarean
shareholders. Staley Continental, No. 88-190-JRR, at 26.
132. Approximately 4501o of the companies whose stock is traded on the New
York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware. Barrett, "Delaware Moves
Closer to Adopting Law to Deter Hostile Takeovers," Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, at
41, col. 4.
133. See supra note 103.
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rations could establish the minimum contacts. It is debatable whether
the prospect of such massive reincorporations and concomitant
dislocations is economically justified on a macro-economic level even
though it may be the logical response by individual corporations to
a conclusive finding that Section 203 is unconstitutional.'3 4 Because
of Delaware's importance as a corporate domicile, predicting the
constitutionality of Section 203 is not a risk free proposition and,
while not openly holding Delaware to be sui generis, the constitutional infirmities of Section 203, especially those concerning interstate commerce, may more likely to be upheld for Delaware than
they would if these issues would be litigated in the context of another
35
state anti-takeover statute.
Due to the constitutional questions concerning Section 203 and
the importance of Delaware as a corporate domicile, the most
appropriate resolution in the area of state anti-takeover legislation
may be federal congressional action amending the Williams Act and
preempting state law at least as to the large, publicly traded corporations that have a demonstrable impact on interstate commerce.1 36
Until CTS, most securities law attorneys and other observers had
assumed that state responses to the takeover battles in recent years
would be unconstitutional. CTS corrected that assumption but has
raised questions of its own which will not be resolved in the near
future. Delaware's legislative response is indicative of the new uncertainty. The new legal uncertainty is set in a context of major
philosophical, ideological and economic disagreements over basic
policy. 131

134. Delaware has traditionally been favorably viewed as a state with a progressive corporation statute. While many other states have adopted provisions similar to
those contained in the Delaware General Corporation Law, Delaware remains in
many ways the state of choice for organizations seeking to incorporate due to its
established body of case law supporting the corporation statute and the level of
judicial competence that has developed in interpreting the statute.
135. See supra note 103 in which two Delaware district court decisions have held
in preliminary injunction actions that plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of proof
in demonstrating that Section 203 was unconsitutional.
136. Several bills are pending in Congress which would amend the Williams Act.
While Chairman Ruder of the Securities and Exchange Commission has frequently
advocated federal preemption with respect to nationally traded corporations, Representative Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, has
just as frequently asserted his opposition to such preemption. In any event, it would
appear that a role would continue to exist for states as to companies that do not
have securities registered under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and are not
subject to the Williams Act.
137. See Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the
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Further, it is difficult to draft solutions to the hostile takeover
problems without affecting other areas of corporation law. For
example, two other interrelated issues are those of the close corporation and the question: who are really the shareholders? With rare
exceptions, hostile takeovers are undertaken only with respect to
target companies whose stock is publicly held or at least very widely
held. Statutes like Indiana's Control Share Acquisition Chapter
attempt a definition of target companies with at least one hundred
shareholders. In trying to separate "close corporations" from others,
drafters have found that in the world of business there is a continuum
of corporations from the mom and pop store to General Motors.
That continuum has no clear gaps in which to draw definitional
lines. Thus, an Indiana corporation might have two resident brothers
who each held twenty percent of the stock and the remainder is
widely held by 120 persons. A majority of the shareholders may not
want to opt out of the statute and the shares held by either brother
may be disenfranchised upon transfer. Whatever tests a state might
use for defining its target companies to be protected, medium-sized
corporations in that state may find themselves on the uncomfortable
side of the line.
The continuum from close corporation to publicly-held corporation forces attention on the shareholder of the corporation. The
traditional images of local investors, widows and pensioners come
to mind. As long as one has such types in mind, it seems sensible to
protect their interests and to let the fate of the corporation rest with
a vote of disinterested shareholders. But it bears pointing out that a
majority of publicized hostile takeovers involves stock which rapidly
drifts into the hands of large institutions and aribtrageurs speculating
on further increases in the stock price. Should a goal of takeover
legislation be to protect stock market speculators?
Before a state legislature feels forced to adopt one of the types
of takeover legislation now available, it should also keep in mind
the simple alternate of doing nothing. There are two quite different
reasons for selecting inaction. The first reason is based upon the
economic viewpoint that all antitakeover legislation impedes the flow
of capital from inefficient use toward more efficient uses, prevents
shareholders from finally realizing their rightful value and protects

Interpretation of Federal Law, 80 Nw. U.L. Rv. 1473 (1986); Leebron, Games
Corporation Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 153 (1986);
and Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111
(1987).
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inefficient or inept incumbent managers. These views can be strongly
held and strongly argued. The second reason is based upon the
realization that shareholders of a publicly-held company are usually
dispersed nationally and the public markets in securities are national
markets. National, uniform federal regulation of this interstate
commerce is preferable to a patchwork of state regulating schemes.
This second argument leads toward the view that whatever reforms
are needed, they need to be done by Congress to the Williams Act.
It is only because the policy decision at the federal level has been
that the law of takeover should be neutral that the losers of that
political fight have turned to state legislation for aid. 3 1

138. Those who have turned to state legislation would respond and the recent
spat of hostile takeover activity and varying forms of financing for such takeover
attempts have indicated that the balance of the Williams Act is actually tipped in
favor of acquirors, and that target companies cannot wait for Congress to restore
neutrality in the Williams Act.

